Opening the Secret Files on Lumumba's Murder
|
The Post's opinion and commentary section runs every Sunday.
•
More in Outlook
| | |
|
By Stephen R. Weissman
Sunday, July 21, 2002; Page B03
In his latest
film, "Minority Report," director Steven Spielberg portrays a policy of
"preemptive action" gone wild in the year 2054. But we don't have to
peer into the future to see what harm faulty intelligence and the loss
of our moral compass can do. U.S. policies during the Cold War furnish
many tragic examples. One was U.S. complicity in the overthrow and
murder of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.
Forty-one
years ago, Lumumba, the only leader ever democratically elected in
Congo, was delivered to his enemies, tortured and summarily executed.
Since then, his country has been looted by the U.S.-supported regime of
Mobutu Sese Seko and wracked by regional and civil war.
The
conventional explanation of Lumumba's death has been that he was
murdered by Congolese rivals after earlier U.S. attempts to kill him,
including a plot to inject toxins into his food or toothpaste, failed.
In 1975, the U.S. Senate's "Church Committee" probed CIA assassination
plots and concluded there was "no evidence of CIA involvement in
bringing about the death of Lumumba."
Not so. I have
obtained classified U.S. government documents, including a chronology
of covert actions approved by a National Security Council (NSC)
subgroup, that reveal U.S. involvement in -- and significant
responsibility for -- the death of Lumumba, who was mistakenly seen by
the Eisenhower administration as an African Fidel Castro. The documents
show that the key Congolese leaders who brought about Lumumba's
downfall were players in "Project Wizard," a CIA covert action program.
Hundreds of thousands of dollars and military equipment were channeled
to these officials, who informed their CIA paymasters three days in
advance of their plan to send Lumumba into the clutches of his worst
enemies. Other new details: The U.S. authorized payments to
then-President Joseph Kasavubu four days before he ousted Lumumba,
furnished Army strongman Mobutu with money and arms to fight
pro-Lumumba forces, helped select and finance an anti-Lumumba
government, and barely three weeks after his death authorized new funds
for the people who arranged Lumumba's murder.
Moreover,
these documents show that the plans and payments were approved by the
highest levels of the Eisenhower administration, either the NSC or its
"Special Group," consisting of the national security adviser, CIA
director, undersecretary of state for political affairs, and deputy
defense secretary.
These facts are four decades old, but
are worth unearthing for two reasons. First, Congo (known for years as
Zaire) is still struggling to establish democracy and stability. By
facing up to its past role in undermining Congo's fledgling democracy,
the United States might yet contribute to Congo's future. Second, the
U.S. performance in Congo is relevant to our struggle against
terrorism. It shows what can happen when, in the quest for national
security, we abandon the democratic principles and rule of law we are
fighting to defend.
In February, Belgium, the former
colonial power in Congo, issued a thousand-page report that
acknowledged "an irrefutable portion of responsibility in the events
that led to the death of Lumumba." Unlike Belgium, the United States
has admitted no such moral responsibility. Over the years, scholars
(including myself) and journalists have written that American policy
played a major role in the ouster and assassination of Lumumba. But the
full story remained hidden in U.S. documents, which, like those I have
examined, are still classified despite the end of the Cold War, the end
of the Mobutu regime and Belgium's confession.
Here's
what they tell us that, until now, we didn't know, or didn't know for
certain:• In August 1960, the CIA established Project Wizard. Congo had
been independent only a month, and Lumumba, a passionate nationalist,
had become prime minister, with a plurality of seats in the parliament.
But U.S. presidential candidate John F. Kennedy was vowing to meet "the
communist challenge" and Eisenhower's NSC was worried that Lumumba
would tilt toward the Soviets.
The U.S. documents show
that over the next few months, the CIA worked with and made payments to
eight top Congolese -- including President Kasavubu, Mobutu (then army
chief of staff), Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko, top finance aide
Albert Ndele, Senate President Joseph Ileo and labor leader Cyrille
Adoula -- who all played roles in Lumumba's downfall.
The
CIA joined Belgium in a plan, detailed in the Belgian report, for Ileo
and Adoula to engineer a no-confidence vote in Lumumba's government,
which would be followed by union-led demonstrations, the resignations
of cabinet ministers (organized by Ndele) and Kasavubu's dismissal of
Lumumba.
• On Sept. 1, the NSC's Special Group authorized
CIA payments to Kasavubu, the U.S. documents say. On Sept. 5, Kasavubu
fired Lumumba in a decree of dubious legality. However, Kasavubu and
his new prime minister, Ileo, proved lethargic over the following week
as Lumumba rallied supporters. So Mobutu seized power on Sept. 14. He
kept Kasavubu as president and established a temporary "College of
Commissioners" to replace the disbanded government.
• The
CIA financed the College and influenced the selection of commissioners.
The College was dominated by two Project Wizard participants: Bomboko,
its president, and Ndele, its vice-president. Another CIA ally, Lumumba
party dissident Victor Nendaka, was appointed chief of the security
police.
• On Oct. 27, the NSC Special Group approved
$250,000 for the CIA to win parliamentary support for a Mobutu
government. However, when legislators balked at approving any prime
minister other than Lumumba, the parliament remained closed. The CIA
money went to Mobutu personally and the commissioners.
•
On Nov. 20, the Special Group authorized the CIA to provide arms,
ammunition, sabotage materials and training to Mobutu's military in the
event it had to resist pro-Lumumba forces.
The full
extent of what one U.S. document calls the "intimate" relationship
between the CIA and Congolese leaders was absent from the Church
Committee report. The only covert action (apart from the assassination
plots) the committee discussed was the August 1960 effort to promote
labor opposition and a no-confidence vote in the Senate.How did Lumumba
die? After being ousted Sept. 5, Lumumba rallied support in parliament
and the international community. When Mobutu took over, U.N. troops
protected Lumumba, but soon confined him to his residence. Lumumba
escaped on Nov. 27. Days later he was captured by Mobutu's troops,
beaten and arrested.
What happened next is clearer thanks
to the Belgian report and the classified U.S. documents. As early as
Christmas Eve 1960, College of Commissioners' president Bomboko offered
to hand Lumumba over to two secessionist leaders who had vowed to kill
him. One declined and nothing happened until mid-January 1961, when the
central government's political and military position deteriorated and
troops guarding Lumumba (then jailed on a military base near the
capital) mutinied. CIA and other Western officials feared a Lumumba
comeback.
On Jan. 14, the commissioners asked Kasavubu to
move Lumumba to a "surer place." There was "no doubt," the Belgian
inquiry concluded, that Mobutu agreed. Kasavubu told security chief
Nendaka to transfer Lumumba to one of the secessionist strongholds. On
Jan. 17, Nendaka sent Lumumba to the Katanga region. That night,
Lumumba and two colleagues were tortured and executed in the presence
of members of the Katangan government. No official announcement was
made for four weeks.
What did the U.S. government tell
its Congolese clients during the last three days of Lumumba's life? The
Church Committee reported that a Congolese "government leader" advised
the CIA's Congo station chief, Larry Devlin, on Jan. 14 that Lumumba
was to be sent to "the home territory" of his "sworn enemy." Yet,
according to the Church Committee and declassified documents, neither
the CIA nor the U.S. embassy tried to save the former prime minister.
The
CIA may not have exercised robotic control over its covert political
action agents, but the failure of Devlin or the U.S. embassy to
question the plans for Lumumba could only be seen by the Congolese as
consent. After all, secret CIA programs had enabled this group to
achieve political power, and the CIA had worked from August through
November 1960 to assassinate or abduct Lumumba.
Here, the
classified U.S. chronology provides an important postscript. On Feb.
11, 1961, with U.S. reports from Congo strongly indicating Lumumba was
dead, the Special Group authorized $500,000 for political action, troop
payments and military equipment, largely to the people who had arranged
Lumumba's murder.
Devlin has sought to distance himself
from Lumumba's death. While the CIA was in close contact with the
Congolese officials involved, Devlin told the Church Committee that
those officials "were not acting under CIA instructions if and when
they did this." In a recent phone conversation with Devlin, I posed the
issue of U.S. responsibility for Lumumba's death. He acknowledged that,
"It was important to [these] cooperating leaders what the U.S.
government thought." But he said he did "not recall" receiving advance
word of Lumumba's transfer. Devlin added that even if he had objected,
"That would not have stopped them from doing it."
By
evading its share of moral responsibility for Lumumba's fate, the
United States blurs African and American history and sidesteps the need
to make reparation for yesterday's misdeeds through today's policy. In
1997, after the Mobutu regime fell, the Congolese democratic opposition
pleaded in vain for American and international support. Since then, as
many as 3 million lives have been lost as a result of civil and
regional war. The United States has not supported a strong U.N.
peacekeeping force or fostered a democratic transition. The collapse in
late April 2002 of negotiations between Congolese factions threatens to
reignite the smoldering conflict or ratify the partition of the
country.
Our government's actions four decades ago in
Congo also have special meaning after the tragedy of Sept. 11. They
warn that even as we justly defend our land and our people against
terrorists, we must avoid the excessive fear and zeal that lead to
destructive intervention betraying our most fundamental principles.
Stephen
Weissman is author of "A Culture of Deference; Congress's Failure of
Leadership in Foreign Policy" (Basic Books). He was staff director of
the U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on Africa from 1986 to
1991.
2002 The Washington Post Company
|